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Abstract
This paper develops and compares two theories of strategic behavior of profes-
sional forecasters. The first theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting
contest with pre-specified rules. In equilibrium of a winner-take-all contest, forecasts
are excessively diﬀerentiated. According to the alternative reputational cheap talk
theory, forecasters aim at convincing the market that they are well informed. The
market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized
state. If the market has naive views on forecasters’ behavior, forecasts are biased
toward the prior mean. Otherwise, equilibrium forecasts are unbiased but imprecise.
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“Much has been written about the doubtful accuracy of economists’ predic-
tions. ... they are better at predicting the direction than the actual magnitude
of events. ... This is disappointing, but it does not mean that economics is not
a science.” (‘Economics’, Encyclopædia Britannica Online).
1. Introduction
Even if economists have a bad name as forecasters, those who are successful are rewarded by
markets and governments alike. Notably, Alan Greenspan and Laurence Meyer practiced
economic forecasting before becoming the current Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Bank and one of its other four current members respectively. As
first argued by Lamont (1995), the microeconomic incentives of macroeconomic forecasters
appear empirically relevant in explaining their behavior.
At the end of every year, Business Week asks a number of economists to predict output,
inflation, and unemployment for the subsequent year. Figure 1 plots the yearly GNP
growth forecasts for the period 1972-1993 from the Business Week Investment Outlook,
as collected by Lamont (1995). Notice that the individual forecasts are rather dispersed,
especially in years such as 1974 (in the aftermath of the oil shock), 1982-3, and 1991. Yet,
average forecasts are less volatile than the realizations. This suggests the possibility that
forecasters strategically herd. In particular, forecasters often fall short of the mark in years
with extreme growth rates. The data also reveals that forecasts are more dispersed in those
years in which the consensus forecast (a misnomer used for the average of the individual
forecasts) is more inaccurate. Regressing the standard deviation of the forecasts on the
absolute error of the consensus forecast, we find a coeﬃcient of .145 with standard error
.063. Thus, there is a significant negative relationship between accuracy and dispersion.
The existence of anonymous surveys (starting in 1946 with the Livingston Survey)
presupposes a belief that forecasters might not report their best predictions if anonymity
were not preserved. While the identity of the forecasters belonging to the panel is typically
available, anonymous surveys do not reveal which individual made which forecasts. A
possible rationale for preserving anonymity is that it can guarantee honest forecasting.
For example, Croushore (1997) argues that in non-anonymous surveys “some participants
might shade their forecasts more toward the consensus (to avoid unfavorable publicity
when wrong), while others might make unusually bold forecasts, hoping to stand out from
the crowd.” When reporting instead to an anonymous survey, forecasters would have no
clear reason to bias or shade their private information.1
In the absence of private information, honest forecasting would be at odds with observed
heterogeneity of forecasts. Forecasters who share a common prior and are given the same
(public) information but no private information should make identical forecasts if they
1By comparing anonymous with non-anonymous surveys, one can evaluate the usefulness of anonymity
and propose methods to improve these surveys (see Section 6).
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honestly report their expectations.2 In their classic study on the rationality of forecasts
using data from the NBER-ASA survey of professional forecasters (later to be called the
Survey of Professional Forecasters), Keane and Runkle (1990) found that diﬀerences in
individual forecasts cannot be explained by publicly available information.3 They inferred
that diﬀerences in forecasts are due to asymmetric information, but this conclusion rests
on their maintained assumption of honest forecasting. The observed dispersion might also
indicate strategic behavior. In order not to introduce a bias against honest forecasting, we
posit that forecasters are endowed with some private information about the state. After
all, the presence of heterogeneous private information is the very reason for the market to
reward forecasters according to their (absolute or relative) accuracy.
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Figure 1. Comparison of individual forecasts of GNP growth from the Business Week
survey with the realizations for the period 1972-1993. Horizontal axis: year forecasted
for. Vertical axis: Annual real GNP growth in percentage points. Forecasts are
represented by circles, ex-post realized values by connected triangles. Data source:
Lamont (1995).
2Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) find empirical support for heterogeneous
processing of public information. Rather than having diﬀerent private information, forecasters might have
diﬀerent models to process the same publicly available information. It is possible to interpret private
information of the posterior belief as deriving from private information of the model (ranked by accuracy)
used to process public information.
3Cf. Zarnowitz (1967) for an early evaluation of forecasts and Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) for a
retrospective discussion of the NBER-ASA survey.
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This paper proposes two theories of strategic behavior by professional forecasters and
compares these with the benchmark case of non-strategic forecasting. In order to facilitate
the comparison, these theories are developed in the context of a unified statistical model.
Our model can be applied to situations where the state cannot be aﬀected by policy and
yet can be meaningfully forecast and later observed.4 For reasons of tractability we use
the normal location experiment: the state has a normal prior distribution and the signals
of the forecasters are normally distributed around the true state. After the forecasters
simultaneously release their forecasts (e.g. the predicted GNP growth rate), the state
(e.g. the realized rate) is publicly observed.
Consider the benchmark case of a forecaster rewarded according to the absolute accu-
racy of the prediction. A non-strategic forecaster reports honestly the posterior expectation
on the state, a weighted average of the signal with the prior mean. As forcefully argued
by Keane and Runkle (1990), “... professional forecasters ... have an economic incentive
to be accurate. Because these professionals report to the survey the same forecasts that
they sell on to the market, their survey responses provide a reasonably accurate measure
of their expectations.” In their later paper, Keane and Runkle (1998) write: “... since
financial analysts’ livelihoods depend on the accuracy of their forecasts ... we can safely
argue that these numbers accurately measure the analysts’ expectations.” Forecasters are
presumed honest, unless proven strategic.
The benchmark model can already oﬀer some explanations for the empirical observa-
tions. Forecasts are dispersed due to private information. Forecasts will be more dispersed
and less accurate in years with relatively little public information, in accordance with the
result of our regression.5 More subtly, although honest forecast errors are uncorrelated
with (i.e., unpredictable from) honest forecasts, they are in fact negatively correlated with
the realized state. Ex post, when a high growth rate has been observed, there is a ten-
dency for the honest forecasts to be too low. The popular press often takes this empirically
documented negative correlation as evidence of herd behavior.6 The academic empirical
4In a number of macroeconomic situations, forecasts can influence policy makers who act to control
the very variable to be predicted (e.g. the growth or inflation rates). However, in the presence of many
forecasters the individual forecaster may perceive his own forecast as having negligible influence on the
state variable. For simplicity, in this paper we assume that forecasts have no impact on the distribution
of the state variable. The more general case is left for future research.
5This observation is consistent with a finding reported by Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) on the ASA-
NBER survey (later known as the Survey of Professional Forecasters). In addition to point forecasts, this
survey initially asked forecasters to report probability distributions. Zarnowitz and Lambros documented
that forecast dispersion is positively correlated with a measure of forecast uncertainty constructed with the
subjectively reported probability forecasts. When the perceived prior uncertainty is higher, the posterior
beliefs of the forecasters are less tight and the resulting forecasts more variable across forecasters.
6In its widely circulated World Economic Outlook, even the International Monetary Fund (2001)
laments that forecasters typically fall short of predicting changes in macroeconomic performance (cf. pages
6-8). In particular, forecasts are often too optimistic when the economy enters a recession, as happened
recently. This is interpreted as a possible indication that economic forecasters use their information
ineﬃciently.
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literature does not fall into this trap, and instead focuses on a possible correlation between
forecasts and their errors: if the direction of the error can be predicted immediately after
the forecast has been issued, why didn’t the forecaster adjust the forecast accordingly?
Our two theories oﬀer some possible rationales.
Our first theory of strategic behavior posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting
contest with pre-specified rules. A number of forecasting contests, such as the Wall Street
Journal semi-annual forecasting survey, are run regularly among economists.7 More gen-
erally, evaluators often rank forecasters by their relative accuracy (see e.g. Stekler (1987)).
We find that reporting the best predictor on the state (the posterior mean conditional
on the signal observed) is not necessarily an equilibrium in the contest. The equilibrium
strikes a balance between two contrasting eﬀects. Individual forecasters wish to report an
accurate forecast, which is most likely to be on the mark, but at the same time they have
an incentive to diﬀerentiate their prediction from those of the competitors. The second
eﬀect is due to the fact that the other forecasters might be even closer to the realized state.
We solve for the equilibrium in a simple winner-take-all contest in which forecasters put
too much weight on their private signals. Compared to honest forecasting, equilibrium
forecasts are excessively diﬀerentiated.8
According to our second theory, forecasts are “cheap talk” made by forecasters who wish
to foster their reputation for being well informed. This reputational cheap talk theory
posits that forecasters are motivated by their professional prospects, as summarized by
the reputation about their forecasting talent. The market evaluates the talent on the
basis of the forecasts released and the realization of the state of the world. Somehow
counter-intuitively, honest forecasting typically cannot occur in equilibrium. The model’s
predictions depend on the level of market rationality. When the market naively believes in
honest forecasting, the forecast which guarantees the highest expected reputational payoﬀ
is not the best predictor of the state. When the market is naive, the optimal individual
forecast turns out to be equal to the posterior expectation conditional on a signal equal
to the true conditional expectation on the state. This is because forecasters want to
pretend they have a signal equal to the posterior mean, which is the one most likely to
be observed by a well-informed forecaster. Deviation forecasts are then biased toward the
prior mean. At equilibrium, the market must have rational expectations regarding the
forecasters’ behavior, so the incentive to herd is self-defeating. Equilibrium forecasts are
then unbiased but systematically less precise than if the forecaster were non strategic.
This theory predicts that the economists’ desire to be perceived as good forecasters results
7For a meteorological forecasting contest see e.g. the National Collegiate Weather Forecasting Contest.
8As discussed in more detail later, Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) consider a similar forecasting
contest in a symmetric information environment. In the absence of heterogeneity of information, there is
no reason to reward accurate forecasters. It turns out that the symmetric equilibrium in the forecasting
contest is much more appealing once private information is introduced, being in pure rather than mixed
strategies.
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in them becoming poor forecasters.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the statistical model. Section 3
develops the forecasting contest theory. Section 4 illustrates the reputational cheap talk
theory. Section 5 compares the predictions of the diﬀerent theories and extends the model
to allow for a common unpredictable component. Section 6 discusses the role of anonymity
in forecasting surveys. Section 7 concludes.
2. Model Setup
Information. There are n forecasters who issue forecasts on an uncertain state of the
world x. It is common prior belief that the state is normally distributed with mean µ
and precision ν, x ∼ N (µ, 1/ν), with p.d.f. q (x) =
p
ν/2π exp
¡
−ν (x− µ)2 /2
¢
. Each
forecaster i has the private signal si = x + εi on the state of the world. Conditionally
on state x, signal si is assumed to be normally distributed with mean x and precision
τ i, si|x ∼ N (x, 1/τ i), with the p.d.f. gi(si|x) =
p
τ i/2π exp
¡
−τ i (si − x)2 /2
¢
. Forecaster
i’s observation of signal si leads to a normal posterior belief on the state with mean
E [x|si] = (τ isi + νµ) / (τ i + v) and precision τ i + ν (cf. DeGroot (1970)). The p.d.f. of
this posterior distribution is denoted by q(x|si).
Honest Forecasting. Our benchmark forecast is the honest report of the posterior
expectation, hi(si) = E [x|si], as assumed by most empirical investigations. In the normal
model the posterior expectation minimizes the mean of any symmetric function of the
forecast error, such as the mean squared error (cf. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985)).
The honest forecast incorporates all available evidence si.
The honest forecast hi(si) has the important statistical property of being uncorrelated
with its forecast error hi(si)−x: E[E[x|si] (E[x|si]− x)] = E[E[E[x|si] (E[x|si]− x) |si]] =
E[E[x|si]E[E[x|si] − x|si]] = 0. This implies that the honest forecast does not carry
information about its forecast error. This orthogonality property may seem a necessary
property of rational forecasts, but is not so. Asymmetric scoring rules generally result
in forecasts violating the property, as exemplified by Zellner (1986). In the symmetric
normal model it is still most natural to impose a symmetric scoring rule on an individual
forecaster. However we will show below that some symmetric games can lead rational
players to use non-orthogonal forecasts. The empirical literature on rational expectations
(e.g. Keane and Runkle (1990, 1998)) assumes that rationality implies honest forecasting
and tests for orthogonality to see if forecasters are rational.
Maximum Likelihood. Forecaster i’s maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) would in-
stead be si, regardless of the prior information. Since E[si|x] = x, the MLE forecast is
9See “Dustmen as Economic Gurus” (The Economist, 3 June 1995) on the good performance of a
sample of London dustmen as forecasters of key economic variables.
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unbiased and the forecast error εi is independent of x. However, the maximum likelihood
forecast violates the orthogonality property: E[si(si − x)] = E[(x+ εi) εi] = 1/τ i > 0.
Note that MLE arises from Bayesian updating with the uniform distribution on the real
line as the improper prior on the state and signals normally distributed conditionally on
the state. We have chosen instead to posit a normal prior on x to reflect the fact that typ-
ically forecasters have some prior idea about the location of the variable to be predicted.
The presence of prior public information drives the results obtained below.10
3. Forecasting Contest Theory
It is natural to investigate whether the competitive pressure from other forecasters provides
incentives to incorporate all available information in the forecast. As discussed in the
introduction, forecasters often participate in contests in which the best forecasters are
rewarded. Consider the following simultaneous winner-take-all forecasting contest. First,
the n forecasters simultaneously submit their forecasts ci ∈ R after each of them has
observed their private signal si. Second, the true state x is publicly observed and the
forecaster whose forecast ci turns out to be closest to x wins a prize n > 0, assumed to be
proportional to the total number of forecasters participating in the contest. In the case of
a tie, all winners share the prize evenly.
There is remarkably little previous work on forecasters’ behavior in contests. In the
applied probability literature, Steele and Zidek (1980) were the first to study a sequential
forecasting contest among two privately informed forecasters. They assumed away game-
theoretic considerations by supposing that the first forecaster reports truthfully. After
observing the first forecast, the second guesser faces a simple decision problem and has a
clear advantage. Steele and Zidek and some follow-up papers focused on the characteri-
zation of the second guesser’s probability of winning. Similarly, Kutsoati and Bernhardt
(2000) adopt a sequential approach to forecasting contests. They provide evidence of
strategic bias in the earnings forecasts released by financial analysts. The last forecaster
strategically selects a forecast that overshoots the consensus forecast in the direction of
the private information.
No-one seems to have noticed that forecasting in a contest is a problem of strategic
location. A forecasting contest with no private information – or equivalently with per-
fectly correlated information, as in Laster et al. (1999) – is identical to Hotelling’s (1929)
pure location game. As is well known (cf. Osborne and Pitchik (1986)), equilibria in this
classic location game crucially depend on the number of players and often involve mixed
strategies. Our forecasting contest theory extends Hotelling’s simultaneous location game
to scenarios where the forecasters (firms) have private information on the distribution of
10This assumption is validated by a number of empirical studies. For example, Welch (2000) finds
evidence that security analysts are strongly influenced by the prevailing consensus.
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the state (location of consumers).11 To simplify the problem, in this paper we consider the
limit as n tends to infinity. In this case we obtain a simple equilibrium in pure strategies.
To play this game, forecasters form conjectures about the distribution of the opponents’
forecasts and calculate their best response. Since the objective is to come closest to
the true x, it is enough to conjecture about the distribution of the best forecast of the
opponents, conditionally on x and si. In general, this distribution can be quite complicated.
To simplify the analysis, we impose two further restrictions. First, we assume that the
forecasters’ signals si are statistically independent conditionally on x. Second, we assume
that the signals of all the forecasters are of common precision τ .
Payoﬀs to forecaster i can then be re-defined as follows. Suppose forecaster i receives
signal si and conjectures that the opponents’ forecasts are distributed according to the
conditional density γ(c|x, si) on the real line. By conditional independence of the signals,
x is suﬃcient for (x, si), so we can write γ(c|x). Suppose forecaster i submits the forecast
ci. Since there is an infinity of opponents, their forecasts are dense on the support of γ,
so forecaster i wins if and only if x = ci. Conditional on winning, the number of players
sharing the size-n prize is approximately nγ(ci|ci). Thus, the expected payoﬀ to forecaster
i is
Ui(ci|si) = q(ci|si)γ(ci|ci) .
3.1. Deviation
Since the logarithm is a strictly increasing function, it is equivalent to let the forecaster
maximize log (q(ci|si)) − log (γ(ci|ci)). Recall that q(x|si) is the p.d.f. of the posterior
normal distribution with mean E[x|si] = (τsi + νµ) / (τ + ν) and precision τ + ν. Then
log (q(ci|si)) is a concave quadratic function of ci, and maximization of the first term
alone would lead the forecaster to choose the honest forecast hi(si) = E[x|si]. But honest
forecasting fails to be an equilibrium because of the second term in the objective function
− log (γ(ci|ci)). In order to win the contest, it is useful to move into the territory of less
common forecasts since the other contestants are then less likely to win the prize. There
is an incentive to move further away from the prior mean µ because the opponents are
more often close to µ:
Proposition 1 (Exaggeration in Contest Deviation) If all other forecasters are fore-
casting honestly by applying the strategy c(s) = (τs+ νµ) / (τ + ν), the contest drives
forecaster i to exaggerate.
11We refer to the companion paper Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) for a more general analysis of fore-
casting contests.
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Proof. Observe that c|x is normally distributed with E[c|x] = (τx+ νµ) / (τ + ν) and
V (c|x) = τ/ (τ + ν)2. Apart from an irrelevant constant term, we have
log (γ(c|c)) = −(τ + ν)
2 (c− (τc+ νµ) / (τ + ν))2
2τ = −
ν2 (c− µ)2
2τ ,
a concave quadratic function of c with peak at µ.
The forecaster maximizes log (q(ci|si)) − log (γ(ci|ci)), the diﬀerence of two concave
quadratic functions. The objective function is concave when the first concave term prevails,
i.e. for (τ + ν) > ν2/τ or equivalently ν/τ <
¡
1 +
√
5
¢
/2. If the precision ratio ν/τ is too
high, the private signals are imprecise relative to the prior belief on x. This induces two
eﬀects. First, opponents with imprecise signals tend to put more weight on the prior, and
therefore make γ(c|c) more concentrated around µ. Second, forecaster i is less certain of
the location of x, making q(x|si) less concentrated around E[x|si]. The two eﬀects go in
the same direction, as log (q(ci|si)) becomes less concave and log (γ(ci|ci)) becomes more
convex.
The forecaster has a unique best reply when ν/τ <
¡
1 +
√
5
¢
/2. When si 6= µ,
this best reply cannot be the honest forecast E[x|si], for at this value of ci the first
term has zero slope while the second term is sloping upwards away from µ. Honesty
is not a robust strategy in this contest, since the extra term in the objective drives
the best reply further away from the prior mean µ than E[x|si]. The first order con-
dition for maximization is ((τ + ν) ci − τsi − νµ) − ν2 (ci − µ) /τ = 0 solved by ci =
(τ2si + (τν − ν2)µ) / (τ2 + τν − ν2).
When instead ν/τ ≥
¡
1 +
√
5
¢
/2, there is no best response for forecaster i to honest
forecasting by the opponents. The incentive to move away from µ is now so strong that
the forecaster wishes to go to the extremes ±∞. ¤
The forecaster is unsure about where to find x, but understands that the opponents
are concentrated around µ. This deviation forecast is a weighted average of si and µ, but
the weight on µ is lower than in the honest forecast. The contest deviation forecast is then
positively correlated with its error: when x is above µ the forecast is too high on average.
3.2. Equilibrium
Having established that honest forecasting is not compatible with equilibrium, we are now
ready to characterize the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, individual forecasters
apply for every si the best response to their conjecture about the opponents’ distribution
γ (c|x), and this conjecture is correct given the strategies of the forecasters. Since all
forecasters have the same precision, the game is symmetric and we find a symmetric
equilibrium whereby all forecasters apply the same strategy:
Proposition 2 (Exaggeration in Contest Equilibrium) For any values of ν and τ
there exists a unique symmetric linear equilibrium c(s) = Cs + (1− C)µ of the contest.
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Forecasters put more weight on their private information than according to the conditional
expectation: C =
¡√
τ2 + 4ντ − τ
¢
/2ν > τ/ (ν + τ).
Proof. The proposition is proved by guessing that the forecasters use linear strategies of
the form c(s) = Cs+(1− C)µ. Consider the best response problem for forecaster i. Given
that the opponents use a linear strategy, conditionally on x their forecasts are normally
distributed with mean Cx+(1− C)µ and variance C2/τ . Up to a constant term we have
log (γ(c|c)) = −τ (c− (Cc+ (1− C)µ))
2
2C2
= −τ (1− C)
2 (c− µ)2
2C2
.
The necessary first order condition for maximization of log (q(ci|si))− log (γ(ci|ci)) is then
− ((τ + ν) ci − τsi − νµ) + τ (1− C)2 (ci − µ) /C2 = 0, solved by
ci =
(C2τ ) si +
¡
C2ν − (1− C)2 τ
¢
µ
C2 (τ + ν)− (1− C)2 τ
.
The fixed-point condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium is that this linear strategy be
equal to the one posited, or C2τ =
¡
C2 (τ + ν)− (1− C)2 τ
¢
C.
Either C is zero, or this reduces to (1− C) τ = C2ν. For large values of C, and at
C = 1 the right-hand side (RHS) of this quadratic equation exceeds the left-hand side
(LHS). At C = 0 and C = τ/ (τ + ν) the LHS instead exceeds the RHS. We conclude that
the equation has two solutions, one negative, and the other in the interval (τ/ (τ + ν) , 1).
Recall that C = 0 also solved the original equation, but this possibility can be ruled out
directly, since in this case the opponents’ forecasts are all concentrated on c = µ. But
then all replies other than µ yield forecaster i higher payoﬀ, so that c = µ cannot be a
symmetric equilibrium.
The second-order condition for the forecaster’s optimization requires that the quadratic
objective is concave. This is satisfied when τ + ν ≥ τ (1− C)2 /C2. By using (1− C) τ =
C2ν, this condition can be reduced to τ ≥ −νC. The positive solution for C clearly
satisfies this condition. Inserting −τ/ν into the quadratic equation for C, its LHS becomes
(ν + τ) τ/ν while the RHS becomes τ2/ν and we see that the LHS exceeds the RHS. The
negative solution to the equation is then below −τ/ν, and it consequently violates the
second order condition. In conclusion, C =
¡√
τ2 + 4ντ − τ
¢
/2ν in the unique linear
symmetric equilibrium. ¤
As in the honest forecast, the weight on the signal is increasing in τ and decreasing in
ν. For all values of ν and τ , this weight is larger than in the honest forecast, so the contest
gives an incentive to move away from µ.12 The equilibrium strikes a balance: opponents
12It turns out that this equilibrium in linear strategies exists for all parameter values. This is slightly
surprising in light of the fact that a bounded best reply to honest forecasting by the opponents only existed
for a subset of the parameter space. Intuitively, when the opponents increase their weight on the signal,
they become less concentrated around µ, and this mitigates the inventive to move away from µ. See also
Section 5.3 on this.
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disperse themselves to such an extent that forecaster i is happy to reply precisely with
the same dispersion. As with the deviation forecast, the equilibrium forecast is positively
correlated with its error.
The contest equilibrium satisfies C < 1, so the forecast is not as extreme as the
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). However, the MLE is in fact robust to the contest if
we take seriously the specification with the uniform distribution on the real line as improper
prior on x. If the opponents forecast c = s, their forecasts are normally distributed
around x, and the term γ (c|c) is constant in c. Forecaster i’s best reply will then be
ci = si, since this constant term does not distort the forecaster’s problem. The contest
distortion thus depends on the presence of prior information that anchors the forecasts
of the opponents around µ. The tendency of opponents to be clustered around the prior
mean drives forecasters away from it.
4. Reputational Cheap Talk Theory
In a forecasting contest, competition takes place according to rules which are clearly set
out in advance. The way in which the market implicitly rewards ex-post successful perfor-
mance is instead often subtler and less structured. For example, the labor and financial
markets perform informal (or subjective) evaluations of the forecasters’ track record and
performance. This Section develops a positive theory of forecasting in which forecasters
aim to impress the market with their talent. It is convenient to think of the market as
performing the passive role of an evaluator. Instead of committing ex ante to a particular
reward scheme, the market optimally evaluates ex post the forecasting ability based on all
the information available. Forecasters with a better reputation can provide more valuable
information and can therefore command higher compensation. To foster their careers,
forecasters want to develop a good reputation for accuracy.
This theory is based on a model first proposed in the second part of Holmstro¨m (1982)
to analyze the behavior of agents who aim at convincing the market that they are well
informed. We follow Scharfstein and Stein (1990) by maintaining the assumption that the
forecasts do not influence the realization or the observability of the state of the world.13
Reputational forecasting is a game of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel (1982)), since a
forecaster’s payoﬀ does not depend directly on the forecast released, but only indirectly
through the interest in the market’s evaluation of ability.14
The structure of our basic statistical model needs to be extended to introduce a latent
parameter representing the unknown talent ti of forecaster i. We further assume that
forecasters and the market share a common non-degenerate prior belief pi(ti) on forecaster
13See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000) for a discussion of the logical connection of the reputational herd-
ing model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Trueman (1994) with the statistical herding model of
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992).
14This is a crucial diﬀerence with the reputational signaling model of Prendergast and Stole (1996).
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i’s talent, with all the talents ti and the state x statistically independent. Conditionally
on state x and talent ti, the signal si is distributed with p.d.f. g˜ (si|x, ti). To obtain the
normal distribution of signal si conditional on state x, si ∼ N (x, 1/τ i), we must haveZ ∞
0
g˜ (si|x, ti) pi (ti) dti = gi(si|x) =
³ τ i
2π
´1/2
exp
Ã
−τ i (si − x)
2
2
!
. (4.1)
It is well known from statistics that it is impossible to satisfy equation (4.1) with g˜ (si|x, ti)
also normally distributed around x and a non-degenerate pi(ti). Among the many possible
specifications of g˜ and pi satisfying equation (4.1), it is natural to posit that si|x, ti has an
exponential power distribution (Box and Tiao (1973), page 517) with p.d.f.
g˜ (si|x, ti) = K1t1/4i exp
Ã
−ti (si − x)
4
12
!
, (4.2)
and let 1/ti follow a Gamma distribution such that ti > 0 has p.d.f.
pi (ti) = K2τ3/2i t
−7/4
i exp
µ
−3τ
2
i
4ti
¶
. (4.3)
The exponential power distribution is similar to the normal, except for the power 4 appear-
ing where the normal has power 2. This information structure is still a location experiment
with log-concave conditional density g˜. Lehmann’s (1988) Theorem 5.3 then guarantees
that the talent ti parametrizes forecaster i’s eﬀectiveness. The precision parameter τ i
can be thought of as an average of the true underlying talent ti, since E [1/ti] = 1/τ2i .
Appendix A provides the constants K1 and K2 and verifies (4.1).
We further simplify the problem by removing the strategic interaction among fore-
casters.15 For the remainder of this Section, we will then focus on a single forecaster
and remove the subscript i. The game proceeds as follows. First, the forecaster issues a
forecast (or message) m after observing the private signals s. Second, the true state x is
observed by the market which uses (m,x) to update the belief p (t) about the forecaster’s
precision t. The forecast m thus serves the role of a signal sent to the market about s,
and the observation of additional information x allows for sorting. The forecaster’s goal is
to obtain a favorable updating on the precision, with the understanding that the market
rewards a good reputation.
To update the beliefs about the forecaster’s talent, the evaluator applies a conjecture
on the forecaster’s strategy mapping s into m and derives the distribution of m condi-
tional on x and t, denoted by ϕ (m|x, t). Bayes’ rule is then used by the evaluator to
15This can be done by assuming that there is neither payoﬀ nor statistical interaction among the
forecasters. First, conditionally on x and t1, . . . , tn, the n forecasters’ private signals si are conditionally
independent, so that forecaster i cannot signal anything to the market about tj when i 6= j. Second,
forecaster i’s objective depends solely on the posterior beliefs about ti, regardless of the posterior beliefs
about tj.
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calculate the posterior reputation p (t|m,x) = ϕ (m|t, x) p(t)/ϕ(m|x) where ϕ (m|x) =R∞
0
ϕ (m|t, x) p(t) dt. To model the forecaster’s preferences over posterior reputations, we
take a two-step von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation. We assume that the forecaster
correctly knows the ϕ function used by the evaluator, so that the forecaster can predict
how the posterior reputation is calculated. The utility of reputation p (t|m,x) is then given
by its expected value of the Bernoulli function u (t),
W (m|x) ≡
Z ∞
0
u(t)p (t|m,x) dt. (4.4)
Recalling that higher t means that the signal si is more valuable in a wide range of decision
problems, the market is assumed to better reward those forecasters with a (first-order
stochastically) better reputation. We secure this property by assuming that u is strictly
increasing. When reporting the message m, the forecaster does not yet know the state x,
but believes it to be distributed according to q (x|s). As diﬀerent forecasters have diﬀerent
beliefs about the state, there is some hope for separation in their strategies. The forecaster
then chooses the message m which maximizes the expected W ,
U(m|s) ≡
Z ∞
−∞
W (m|x)q (x|s) dx. (4.5)
4.1. Deviation
Consider first what happens when the evaluator conjectures that the forecaster applies the
benchmark honest strategy h (s) = (τs+ νµ) / (τ + ν). We prove that the forecaster who
maximizes U (m|s) has a simple deviation from this strategy:
Proposition 3 (Conservatism in Reputational Deviation) If the evaluator conjec-
tures honest forecasting h (s), the forecaster biases the forecast towards the prior mean by
reporting
d (s) = h (h (s)) =
µ
τ
τ + ν
¶2
s+
Ã
1−
µ
τ
τ + ν
¶2!
µ.
Proof. If the evaluator conjectures honest forecasting, observation of m = h (s) and x
allows the inference of the realized signal sˆ = h−1 (m) and error εˆ = sˆ− x. The updating
of the reputation is then
p (t|m,x) = g˜ (sˆ|x, t) p (t)
g (sˆ|x) ∝ t
−3/2 exp
µ
−tεˆ
4
12
− 3τ
2
4t
+
τ εˆ2
2
¶
.
This posterior reputation satisfies two intuitive properties. First, due to the symmetry of
the distributions, the posterior reputation depends on m and x only through the absolute
size of the error, |εˆ|. Second, a small realized absolute error is good news about the
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forecaster’s talent: for any t < t0, we see that the likelihood ratio p (t|m,x) /p (t0|m,x) ∝
exp
¡
(t0 − t) εˆ4/12
¢
is increasing in |εˆ|. A higher error shifts weight to lower values of t,
making p (t|m,x) worse in the first-order stochastic dominance order. These two properties
imply that W (m|x) is a strictly decreasing function of |h−1 (m)−x| (see Milgrom (1981)).
Consider the best response of the forecaster with signal s to such updating by the
evaluator. The forecaster’s posterior distribution on the state is normal with mean h (s)
and variance 1/ (ν + τ). If the forecaster submits message m, the evaluator infers that
the signal is equal to h−1 (m) and the forecast error is h−1 (m)− x. The inferred forecast
error is then normally distributed with mean h−1 (m)−h (s) and variance 1/ (ν + τ ). The
forecaster’s best reply maximizes the expected value of W , or equivalently minimizes the
expected value of −W which is a symmetric loss function of the error. The forecaster then
chooses m such that the error has mean zero, by letting h−1 (m) = h (s). ¤
This fundamentally new insight into herding is quite intuitive. The forecaster wants
to be perceived as having a signal s equal to the posterior expectation h (s) on the state,
which is most likely to result in favorable reputation updating. But unless the posterior
expectation puts zero weight on the prior belief (as with a perfectly informative signal
or an improper prior), the signal is more extreme than the posterior expectation. So, if
the market naively believes that the forecast reflects truthfully the forecaster’s posterior
expectation, the forecaster deviates by reporting d (s) = h(h (s)). Sophisticated forecasters
who are taken at face value report conservative forecasts in order to fool the market into
believing that they have more accurate signals.
4.2. Equilibrium
We have seen that if the market expects the honest forecasting strategy h (s), the forecaster
will deviate to the iterated h (h (s)). Soon the market should learn this fact, and it should
start to base its updating on the conjecture that the forecaster’s strategy is h (h (s)).
However, by the same reasoning, the forecaster will then again fool the market by deviating
to h (h (h (s))) and so on. Avoiding this spiral of ever more sophisticated beliefs, a Nash
equilibrium is a rest point of this process.
According to Proposition 3, honest forecasting is incompatible with equilibrium. As
this is a cheap-talk game, a stronger implication follows: there exists no fully separating
equilibrium. By definition, in a fully separating equilibrium, the strategy mapping signals
into forecasts can be inverted. As before, the evaluator infers the signal through inversion
of the strategy, but the forecaster with signal s then wishes to deviate to the forecast
corresponding to signal s0 = E[x|s], which is diﬀerent from s whenever s 6= µ.
Non-existence of a fully separating equilibrium is not a particularly surprising finding
in a cheap-talk setting. Another common property of cheap-talk games is that there exists
an equilibrium with complete pooling. In such a babbling equilibrium, the forecaster issues
the same message m regardless of the signal received, and any message received by the
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evaluator is interpreted as carrying no information about the signal. More generally, not
all information is conveyed to the evaluator. Equilibrium forecasting must necessarily
involve some degree of pooling (or bunching) of signals into messages.
The reputational equilibrium forecast satisfies the orthogonality property. Due to the
cheap talk nature of the game, the actual language used to send equilibrium messages
is indeterminate. But the market can easily translate message m into the best estimate
conditionally on m, namely E[x|m]. So, the forecaster is eﬀectively communicating E[x|m]
to the evaluator. Being a conditional expectation of x, this forecast is uncorrelated with
its error. We conclude:
Proposition 4 (Coarseness in Reputational Equilibrium) There is no reputational
cheap talk equilibrium with full revelation of information. There exist partially and fully
pooling equilibria. Any equilibrium can be defined with a language such that the forecast
has the orthogonality property.
Because of the coarseness of the message, the evaluator loses information regarding not
only the location of the state x, but also the forecaster’s talent t. More precise information
on t would be a useful input to assess the importance of future forecasts from the same
person, so this will again imply a loss of information about future states of the world.
Next we show by example that there exists a partially separating equilibrium whereby
some information is conveyed through the messages. In this example there are two mes-
sages, naturally defined from the model’s symmetry around µ. The equilibrium strategy
of the forecaster is to report a high message mH whenever the signal s weakly exceeds
the prior mean µ and a low message mL when s < µ. A forecaster is indiﬀerent between
these two messages when receiving signal µ. When observing a higher signal s > µ, the
forecaster expects high values of the state to be realized and prefers to send message mH
rather than mL in order to indicate a positive signal, implying smaller average errors:
Result 1 (Binary Reputational Equilibrium) In the reputational cheap talk model
there exists a symmetric binary equilibrium.
Proof. When observing message mH and state x, the evaluator infers that the signal’s
error satisfies ε = s − x ≥ µ − x. Similarly, evaluator infers ε < µ − x upon observation
of mL and x. For any t, the error ε is equally likely as the error −ε by (4.2). Sending
message mH in state x carries the exact same information about t as sending message mL
in state 2µ − x, which is equally far, from but on opposite sides of, µ. This implies the
symmetry property W (mH |x) = W (mL|2µ− x).
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the smaller the error perceived by the evaluator,
the more favorable the posterior reputation. When x < µ, message mH conveys that the
error is at least as large as the positive number µ−x. It can be verified that this message is
worse news about the talent than the neutral message that ε ≥ 0, which also contains some
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of the more favorable errors close to zero. Thus we haveW (mH |x) < W (mH |µ) for x < µ.
Symmetrically, it is good news about the talent to see that ε exceeds some negative number,
since this observation includes more errors close to zero. Thus W (mH |x) > W (mH |µ)
when x > µ. Applying symmetry, we conclude from the two inequalities that W (mH |x) >
W (mL|x) when x > µ.
Next, we show that the forecaster does not wish to deviate from the putative equilib-
rium strategy. By symmetry, it suﬃces to assume that s ≥ µ and check that U (mH |s) ≥
U (mL|s). Using (4.5) and the symmetry of W , we have
U (mH |s)− U (mL|s) =
Z ∞
−∞
(W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)) q (x|s) dx
=
Z ∞
µ
(W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)) (q (x|s)− q (2µ− x|s)) dx.
Since q (x|s) is the p.d.f. of a unimodal symmetric normal distribution with a mean
weakly above µ, we have q (x|s) ≥ q (2µ− x|s) when x ≥ µ. We already had W (mH |x) >
W (mL|x) when x > µ, so the integrand of the last integral is everywhere non-negative,
implying that the integral is non-negative, i.e. that U (mH |s) ≥ U (mL|s) as desired.
Since the message space has not been restricted, we also need to specify the evaluator’s
beliefs following any third out-of-equilibrium message. We posit that the evaluator in this
case assumes that the forecaster possessed a signal s < µ, resulting in the same posterior
reputation as message mL. These beliefs satisfy the requirements of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. ¤
Rather than performing direct tests of reputational cheap talk, most of the existing
empirical literature provides indirect evidence of reputational concerns based mostly on
heterogeneity across forecasters. Lamont (1995) finds that older forecasters tend to devi-
ate more from the consensus. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that older mutual fund
managers have bolder investment strategies. Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) conclude
that the lower accuracy of older stock analysts is due the fact that they move earlier.
Unfortunately, no one has so far attempted to model the endogenous timing of forecasts
when the agents are concerned about their reputation or relative accuracy.16
The reputational cheap talk theory can be extended to allow for private information of
forecasting ability, mixed objectives, and concern for relative reputation among forecasters.
We refer to the companion paper Ottaviani and Sørensen (1999) for a more general the-
oretical analysis and discussion of the empirical literature. See also Zitzewitz (2001b) for
an interesting model in which the market uses a simple econometric technique to evaluate
the quality of the information contained in the forecasts.
16In Gul and Lundholm (1995) forecasters care about the absolute accuracy as well as delay. A forecaster
with a more extreme signal acts earlier at equilibrium.
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5. Discussion
5.1. Forecast Variability
Except for the reputational equilibrium forecasts, we have found linear forecasting rules
of the form fi (si) = Fisi + (1− Fi)µ for some constant weight Fi between 0 and 1. From
the given distribution of si, we derive the conditional distribution of the linear forecast,
fi|x ∼ N
¡
Fix+ (1− Fi)µ,F 2i /τ i
¢
. (5.1)
We now describe the variance of the forecasts under the diﬀerent theories.
Honest Forecast. The conditional variance of the honest forecast V (hi|x) = τ i/ (τ i + ν)2
is increasing in the signal precision if the forecaster is imprecise enough (τ i < ν), but de-
creasing when instead the expert is precise (τ i > ν). When the signal is poorly informative
(τ i ≈ 0), the honest forecast is concentrated on the prior mean and so the conditional vari-
ance is also near 0. When τ i is very large, the conditional variance is again near 0 because
a perfectly informative signal gives an honest forecast concentrated on the true state.
Contest Equilibrium Forecast. The conditional variance of the contest forecast is
C2/τ =
¡
2ν + τ −
√
τ2 + 4ντ
¢
/2ν2. The conditional variance of forecasts converges to
1/ν in the limit as the private signal becomes uninformative τ → 0. This concords with
Osborne and Pitchik’s (1986) finding that with infinitely many symmetrically informed
forecasters the distribution of equilibrium locations replicates the common prior distribu-
tion for x. Addition of private information has the desirable eﬀect of inducing a symmetric
location equilibrium in pure rather than mixed strategies. Note that the conditional vari-
ance of the distribution of the equilibrium contest forecasts decreases in τ and converges to
0 as τ →∞. This is in sharp contrast to the non-monotonicity of the conditional variance
of the honest forecast. In cases with imprecise private signals, one could check empirically
whether forecasts are very widely dispersed as in the contest, or quite close together as in
the case of honest forecasting.
Reputational Deviation Forecast. The conditional variance of the reputational de-
viation forecast is τ3/ (τ + ν)4 with variance first increasing in τ , maximal at τ = 3ν, and
then decreasing in τ . Compared to the forecasts under truthtelling and in the forecasting
contest, the reputational deviation forecast puts more weight on the prior mean, and is
therefore less variable.
Reputational Equilibrium Forecast. The reputational equilibrium forecast of Result
1 is binomially distributed and therefore not directly comparable with the normally dis-
tributed forecasts which result in the cases described above. When forecasters mean what
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they say, mL = E[x|s < µ] and mH = E[x|s ≥ µ]. By applying the well-known result that
E[y|y > 0] = σp2/π for a normal variable y ∼ N(0, σ2) (cf. Johnson and Kotz (1970)),
we see that E[x|s ≥ µ] is equal to
E[E[x|s]|s ≥ µ] = E[τs+ νµτ + ν |s ≥ µ] = µ+
τ
τ + νE [s− µ|s > µ] = µ+
s
2τ
πν (τ + ν) .
By symmetry, we have mL = µ −
p
2τ/πν (τ + ν). The more precise the signal of the
forecaster (i.e., the greater τ), the greater the amount by which the message moves the
prior beliefs on the state.
Given x, the chance of the forecast taking the high valueE[x|s ≥ µ] is 1−Φ (√τ (µ− x))
where Φ is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. Thus
E[r|x] = µ+ ¡1− 2Φ ¡√τ (µ− x)¢¢s 2τπν (τ + ν)
and the variance of the binomial distribution is
V [r|x] = 4 ¡1− Φ ¡√τ (µ− x)¢¢Φ ¡√τ (µ− x)¢ 2τπν (τ + ν)
For any x, we have Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)) ∈ [0, 1] so 4 (1− Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)))Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)) ≤
1, where the bound is tight being achieved for x = µ. We conclude that V [r|x] ≤
2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)).
To compare this with the variance of the honest forecast, observe that
2τ
πν (τ + ν) ≤
τ
(τ + ν)2
if and only if τ/ν ≤ (π − 2) /2. If the signal is not very precise, the conditional variance
is uniformly higher under honesty than under the binary equilibrium. But the inequality
is reversed when the signal has high precision and x is close to µ. In that case, the
signals and thus the honest forecast is highly concentrated near µ, while the reputational
forecast is highly variable with even chance of a positive and negative update of amountp
2τ/πν (τ + ν).17
Comparison of Variances. Figure 2 plots the conditional variances as a function of τ
when ν = 1 for four forecasts: honest h, contest c, reputational deviation d, reputational
binary equilibrium r. This graph makes clear that herding or exaggeration can be inferred
17Graham (1999) performs comparative statics on the second mover’s incentives for deviation from a
separating equilibrium with respect to changes in prior reputation, forecast ability and conditional signal
correlation. Our analysis in this paper shows that equilibrium comparative statics is substantially diﬀerent.
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from forecast dispersion only after controlling for the quality of the forecaster’s information.
This point is also emphasized by Zitzewitz (2001a).
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Figure 2. Conditional variances of forecasts as function of average precision τ . The
solid line corresponds to the conditional variance of the honest forecast V [h|x], long
dashes to the reputational deviation forecast V [d|x], medium dashes to the reputational
equilibrium forecast V [r|x = µ], and short dashes to the contest forecast V [c|x].
5.2. Forecast Error
The linear forecasts (5.1) with weight Fi less than 1 are not unbiased, since E[fi|x] > x
when x < µ and E[fi|x] < x when x > µ. The conditional mean of the linear forecast only
goes part of the way from the prior µ to the true state x. We see that all these forecasts,
including the honest one, possess the oft-lamented property that forecasters fail to predict
extreme values. This property is therefore not evidence of ineﬃcient conservativeness on
the part of the forecasters.
In a similar vein, the forecast error fi−x is negatively correlated with x (since E[(fi−
x)x] = E[(Fiεi + (1− Fi) (µ− x)) x] = − (1− Fi) /ν < 0). The forecast error can be
predicted after the state x has been observed, even if forecasters are not conservative.
When x is high (low) the error tends to be negative (positive). Furthermore, even if their
signals are conditionally independent, there is correlation among the forecast errors of
any pair i, j of forecasters. Thus, assume that εi is independent of εj. The covariance of
fi − x = (Fiεi + (1− Fi) (µ− x)) with fj − x is (1− Fi) (1− Fj) /ν > 0. This covariance
is positive because forecasters tend to make equal-signed errors of opposite sign of x.
To remove this correlation, one could alternatively study forecaster i’s shock as fi −
E[fi|x] = Fiεi. This error follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance F 2i /τ i,
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and is uncorrelated with x and with the errors of other forecasters. This makes them
useful observations for regression analysis. Empirically, E[fi|x] may not be known by the
data analyst even when x has been realized, and it is a common approach to estimate it
using the consensus forecast, to which we now turn.
When n ≥ 2 forecasters have issued their forecasts, it is simple to calculate the un-
weighted average forecast f¯ =
Pn
i=1 fi/n, often referred to as the consensus forecast. In
general, this is not the optimal forecast given the n signals.18 For example, when the
individual errors εi are statistically independent, the correlation of the honest consensus
forecast with its error is negative, since the forecast tends to be too low when x exceeds µ
and too high when x is below µ.19 When all forecasters have equal precision and indepen-
dent errors, we see that f¯ converges almost surely to E[f |x] as n→∞ by the strong law
of large numbers. Thus, asymptotically the shocks relative to the consensus fi − f¯ have
the desirable uncorrelation properties.
5.3. Orthogonality
Consider linear forecasting rules of the form fi (si) = Fisi + (1− Fi)µ. We have already
noted that under honesty the forecast is uncorrelated with its error fi − x when Fi =
τ i/ (ν + τ i). More generally, the correlation is
E [(fi − x)fi] = E [(Fiεi + (1− Fi) (µ− x)) (Fi (x+ εi) + (1− Fi)µ)] = Fi
µ
Fi
τ i
− 1− Fiν
¶
.
Clearly, this correlation has the same sign as Fi−τ i/ (τ i + ν). There is positive correlation
when Fi is larger as in the contest, and negative correlation when Fi is smaller as in the
reputational deviation. The reputational equilibrium forecast satisfies orthogonality but is
not eﬃcient.
As noted above, all types of forecast had errors negatively correlated with the state
x. Thus, after knowing x the sign of the errors could be predicted. However, this is an
unreasonably strong test of the forecasters’ abilities since x is still known when the forecasts
18An extensive literature in operations research studies the problem of how to optimally combine fore-
casts obtained with diﬀerent methods or incorporating diﬀerent information sets. See e.g. the early
contributions by Bates and Granger (1969) and Bunn (1975). That literature does not, however, consider
the possibility of strategic behavior by the forecasters.
19The weight that the conditional expectation E[x|s1, . . . , sn] = (νµ+τ1s1+· · ·+τnsn)/(ν+τ1+· · ·+τn)
attaches to si is τ i/τ j times the weight to sj . In the consensus forecast, the ratio of weights is instead
τ i(τj + ν)/τj (τ i + ν), so that too much weight is given to the least precise signals. Even when all
forecasters are equally precise, the weight accorded to the prior mean µ is too large and the consensus
forecast fails to inherit the orthogonality property from the individual forecasts. In this case the consensus
honest forecast is h¯ = (nνµ+ τ
Pn
i=1 si) / (nν + nτ) = (nνµ+ nτx+ τ
Pn
i=1 εi) / (nν + nτ) and the error
is h¯− x = (nν (µ− x) + τ
Pn
i=1 εi) / (nν + nτ), so that the covariance is always negative: E[h¯(h¯− x)] =
− (n− 1) τ/n (ν + τ)2 < 0 for n > 1. Kim, Lim and Shaw (2001) suggest methods to correct for the loss
of information in the consensus forecast.
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are released. If they report honestly, their error cannot be predicted from the forecast.
The contest forecast and the reputational deviation forecast fail instead to inherit this
property, so that once a forecast has been released the sign of its error can be predicted.
A typical empirical test for the hypothesis that the forecasts are conditional expecta-
tions (E[x|Ii] for some information set Ii) is based on regressing the forecast error on the
forecast. Most studies report a positive correlation of the forecast and its error, consistent
with the contest theory. For example, Batchelor and Dua (1992) find that forecasters put
too little weight on the forecasts previously released by other forecasters (or, equivalently
in our model, on the prior mean). However, Keane and Runkle (1990, 1998) cannot sup-
port any bias, as they note that the tests are not as powerful as is usually assumed. There
is significant positive correlation among the residuals in this regression. This is evidence
of a common error in the forecasts. In the case of GDP growth forecasts, over a year
elapses from the submission of the forecasts before the data are realized. Within this year,
unpredictable changes to the actual growth rate often occur. This causes the correlation
found in the data.
5.4. Common Error
The model can be easily extended to account for such an ex-post innovation in the state.
The n forecasters still receive signals si = x + εi, with the same distribution as before.
We maintain the assumption that x, ε1, . . . , εn are stochastically independent. However,
the state later realized is not x but actually y = x + ε0. We naturally assume that ε0 ∼
N (0, 1/τ 0) is independent of x and the other errors, so that the change is unpredictable.
The error ε0 plays the role of a common error in the signals about the observed state y,
for forecaster i observes si = y − ε0 + εi.
The honest forecast of y is the same as the honest forecast of x, since the subsequent
error is unpredictable. Indeed, E[y|si] = E[x + ε0|si] = E[x|si] by the independence
assumption. However, the posterior beliefs about y are less precise than the posterior
beliefs about x due to the added error term. The variance of the normally distributed y|si
is 1/ (τ i + ν) + 1/τ 0. Let q˜i (y|si) denote the p.d.f. of this posterior belief.
5.4.1. Contest Theory
The contest winner is now the forecaster who gets closest to the realized state y. We
maintain the assumption that all forecasters have equal precision τ i = τ for i 6= 0 and
extend the definition of forecaster i’s payoﬀ as follows. Suppose forecaster i receives signal
si and conjectures that opponents’ forecasts are distributed according to the conditional
density γ(c|y, si) on the real line. If forecaster i submits the forecast ci, the logarithm of
the expected payoﬀ is log (Ui(ci|si)) = log (q˜(ci|si))− log (γ(ci|ci, si)) .
As before, the action comes from the second term. Observation of y and of si gives
two independent sources of information on the location of x. Clearly, x|y, si is normally
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distributed with mean (νµ+ τ 0y + τsi) /(ν + τ0 + τ) and precision ν + τ0 + τ . Assuming
that forecaster i conjectures that the opponents apply a linear strategy c(sj) = Csj +
(1− C)µ = Cx+Cεj +(1− C)µ, the opponents’ forecasts are normally distributed with
E[c|y, si] = (1− C)µ+C (νµ+ τ 0y + τsi) / (ν + τ0 + τ) and variance C2/ (ν + τ0 + τ) +
C2/τ with the last term coming from εj. Except for a constant term, log (γ(ci|ci, si)) is
equal to the following quadratic function of ci:
− (ν + τ0 + τ) τ
2 (ν + τ0 + 2τ)C2
µ
ci − (1− C)µ− C
νµ+ τ 0ci + τsi
ν + τ 0 + τ
¶2
.
Once the analysis of the forecasting contest is repeated for this extension, one finds
that there is no symmetric linear Nash equilibrium when τ/ν is large relative to τ 0/ν. In
this case, the forecasters have poor information on the location of y, and log (q˜(ci|si)) is
not very concave. Still, they have good information about the state and about the other
forecasters’ signals, resulting in the convexity of log (γ(ci|ci, si)) being too large when the
other forecasters use best replies. When instead τ/ν is small relative to τ 0/ν, there is a
linear equilibrium with similar features to the one studied in the benchmark model.
5.4.2. Reputational Theory
To extend the reputational theory, we must now take the interaction of the n forecasters
more seriously, since the errors ε1, . . . , εn are correlated conditionally on y. In order to
update beliefs about the precision of forecaster i, the evaluator uses the information on
the location of x contained in the realized y as well as in the n forecasts.
First, we verify that it is not a Nash equilibrium for every forecaster to honestly report
h(si) (or use any other fully separable strategy). We prove that forecaster 1 would wish
to deviate as before – the same argument applies to all other forecasters. Under the
assumption that all forecasters 2, . . . , n report honestly, the market can infer their signals
s2, . . . , sn. Based on the n conditionally independent normal signals s2, . . . , sn, y about x,
the market first updates its beliefs about x to arrive at a normal posterior as usual. From
the point of view of forecaster 1, this updating is equivalent to the forecaster receiving
a more precise signal z about x. The problem faced by forecaster 1 is then a slightly
complicated version of the problem analyzed earlier. The market does not observe x, but
only receives a signal z about it. The market assumes that 1 is honest, and inverts the
strategy to infer the signal s1 = h
−1
1 (m1) from the message m1. By the law of iterated
expectations, the posterior reputation is p (t|m1, z) = E[p (t|m1, x) |z] – the evaluator’s
beliefs on t is the average of the beliefs the market would have held when observing x.
Using this fact, we arrive at U (m1|s1) =
R∞
−∞W (mi|x)E[q (x|z) |si] dx where E[q (x|z) |si]
is the forecaster’s expectation of the evaluator’s beliefs on x, and where W (mi|x) is as
before. It is simple to verify that E[q (x|z) |si] is a normal density for x with a mean
between µ and si. As before, forecaster 1 deviates in order to give the impression of
having a signal equal to that posterior mean.
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Second, it is again a Nash equilibrium for every forecaster to use the binary strategy of
Result 1. A forecaster with signal si = µ regards the two possible messages as symmetric,
and is thus indiﬀerent. A forecaster with signal si > µ thinks it more likely that other
forecasters report that they saw sj > µ, and thinks it more likely that the market observes
y > µ – alas forecaster i considers it more likely that the market’s posterior beliefs on x
are shifted upwards. Forecaster i then prefers to send the message which signals si > µ.
We conclude that our theoretical findings are robust to the addition of ex-post noise.
Since the evaluator does not have access to x, even honest revelation of si does not
allow for the calculation of the individual εi. We have seen how the evaluator modifies
the Bayesian procedure in this context, averaging over the possible values of x given the
available information, including the messages from the other forecasters. Recall that under
a linear strategy fi − E[fi|x] = Fiεi is proportional to the error and that in the case of
many forecasters, the consensus forecast provides a good approximation for E[fi|x]. A
forecast close to the consensus then indicates a small absolute value of εi and is therefore
good news about the forecaster’s ability.
6. The Role of Anonymity
In order to test the diﬀerent theories, it might be useful to compare non-anonymous with
anonymous forecasting surveys. Figure 3 plots the individual forecasts for the period 1972-
1993 in the Survey of Professional Forecasters of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
the most prominent anonymous survey of professional forecasters (see also Stark (1997).
Even though the name of the author of each forecast is not made public, each forecaster
is identified by a code number. It is then possible to follow each individual forecaster
over time. As reported by Croushore (1993): “This anonymity is designed to encourage
people to provide their best forecasts, without fearing the consequences of making forecasts
errors. In this way, an economist can feel comfortable in forecasting what she really believes
will happen [...]. Also, the participants are more likely to take an extreme position that
they believe in (for example, that the GDP will grow 5 per cent in 1994, without feeling
pressure to confirm to the consensus forecast. The negative side of providing anonymity,
of course, is that forecasters can’t claim credit for particularly good forecast performance,
nor can they be held accountable for particularly bad forecasts. Some economists feel that
without accountability, forecasters may make less accurate predictions because there are
fewer consequences to making poor forecasts.”
When reporting to anonymous surveys, forecasters have no reason not to incorporate
all available private information. Forecasters are typically kept among the survey panelists
if their long-term accuracy is satisfactory. By eﬀectively sheltering the forecasters from
the short-term evaluation of the market, anonymity could reduce the scope for strategic
behavior and induce honest forecasting. Under the assumption that forecasters report
honestly in the anonymous surveys, one could test for the presence of strategic behavior
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in the forecasts publicly released (non-anonymous surveys).
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Figure 3. Comparison of individual forecasts of GNP growth from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters with the realizations for the period 1972-1993. Axes and
symbols as in figure 1. See Stark (1997).
A problem with the hypothesis of honest forecasting in anonymous surveys is that our
theory does not predict behavior in this situation. As confirmed to us by Croushore and
Lamont, forecasters often seem to submit to the anonymous surveys the same forecasts
they have already prepared for public (i.e. non-anonymous) release. There are two reasons
for this: first, it might not be convenient for them to change their report, unless they have
a strict incentive to do so; second, they might be concerned that their strategic behavior
be uncovered to the editor of the anonymous survey.
As seen in Figure 3, the forecasts in the anonymous Survey of Professional Forecasters
are widely dispersed throughout the entire period considered. In comparison with Figure
1, this suggests that less herding might be present in the anonymous survey. However,
this possibility needs more careful investigation. The composition of the forecasters’ panel
of the Survey of Professional Forecasters has recently be made available to researchers.
The joint hypothesis of honest reporting in anonymous surveys and strategic forecasting
in non-anonymous surveys could nevertheless be tested by pooling in a single regression
all the forecasters belonging to both data sets. It would then be possible to evaluate the
usefulness of keeping anonymous surveys.
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7. Conclusion
This paper has adopted a positive approach, but it suggests a number of natural normative
questions. Motivated mainly by the needs of accurate probabilistic weather forecasts, a
large literature in meteorology and statistics studies how to motivate forecasters to form
and state their correct subjective probabilities (cf. Dawid’s (1986) overview). Statisticians
have developed scoring rules that elicit truthful information and avoid misrepresentation
of the forecaster’s beliefs (see e.g. de Finetti (1965) and Savage (1971)). Combining the
insights of this literature with the economic theory of regulation, Osband (1989) studies the
optimal provision of forecasting incentives in the presence of costly information acquisition.
The normative literature on scoring rules has focused on the case of single forecasters.
Clearly, there is no gain from conditioning the state-contingent reward on the messages of
other forecasters when the realized state is suﬃcient for such messages. When instead the
state is observed with noise, or equivalently when forecasters possess conditionally depen-
dent signals, conditioning the reward also on the competitors’ forecasts might improve the
incentives for forecast accuracy.
Forecasting is proving to be an apt laboratory for improving our understanding of
strategic communication and positioning by non-partisan informed agents. The availability
of data sets and the richness of institutional details can inspire and give discipline to our
theorizing. The insights gained can be helpful in shedding light on a number of other social
and economic problems, such as the choice of research topic by scientists. As also stressed
by Banerjee (1989), rewarding originality counteracts the natural tendency to herd, but it
is an imperfect tool.
Interesting phenomena emerge in simple and plausible models, without the need to
depart from rationality. While this can be considered as a strength of our approach, it is
also a limitation, in view of the experimental evidence on deviations from the Bayesian
paradigm. For example, according to the representativeness bias (Kahneman and Tversky
(1973)), forecasters often disregard prior information when making intuitive predictions.
Experimental subjects tend to put excessive weight on the signal they receive and be
overconfident in their predictions. The representativeness bias has similar implications to
our contest model. The reputational theory can easily be extended to the case where the
underlying talents of forecasters are perceived to be heterogenous.20 More work needs to
be done on building and testing behaviorally plausible models of forecasting.21
20In an early behavioral model of financial advice, Denton (1985) assumes that investors listen to
financial advisers who have no real information. In some cases, this might well be the case. For example,
Hartzmark (1991) found that futures forecasters depend on luck rather than forecasting ability. Zitzewitz
(2001a) instead finds that security analysts diﬀer greatly in performance, justifying the assumption that
they are fundamentally heterogeneous.
21Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) run an early horse race between economic and phsycological explana-
tions for biases in forecasting.
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Appendix: Information
The distribution of t is described by the p.d.f.
p (t) =
33/4Γ (1/4) τ 3/2
4π t
−7/4 exp
µ
−3τ
2
4t
¶
on (0,∞), where Γ (v) =
R∞
0
uv−1e−udu , the well-known Gamma function. We wish
to prove that this integrates to 1. We show that transformation to y = 1/t gives the
well-known p.d.f. of the Gamma distribution with parameters 3/4 and 3τ 2/4. From
dy = −y2dt, we see that the p.d.f. of y on (0,∞) is
y−2
33/4Γ (1/4) τ 3/2
4π y
7/4 exp
µ
−3τ
2
4
y
¶
=
(3τ2/4)3/4
Γ (3/4) y
−1/4 exp
µ
−3τ
2
4
y
¶
,
as desired. The constants are correct since (τ 2)3/4 = τ3/2, 43/4 = 2
√
2, and the Gamma
function satisfies Γ (y)Γ (1− y) = π/ sin (πy) so that Γ (1/4)Γ (3/4) = π/ sin (π/4) =√
2π.
Next we verify that equation (4.1) is satisfied. The p.d.f. of the signal conditional on
the state is thenZ ∞
0
g˜ (s|x, t) p (t) dt =
Z ∞
0
√
3τ3/2
2π
√
2
t−3/2 exp
Ã
−3τ
2
4t
− t (s− x)
4
12
!
dt.
Note that the density of t appearing under the integral is that of the Inverse Gaussian
distribution, and its well-known specification (use e.g. (4.2) of Johnson and Kotz (1970)
page 139 with their parameters ϕ = τ (s− x)2 /2 and µ = 3τ (s− x)−2) allows us to
continue with
=
√
3τ 3/2
2π
√
2
p
4π/3
τ exp
Ã
−τ (s− x)
2
2
!
=
r
τ
2π exp
Ã
−τ (s− x)
2
2
!
= g(s|x),
the Normal distribution with mean x and precision τ .
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